ON PAKISTAN'S LEAKING BORDERS





Wasn’t it General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, once US Commander of the US Forces in the Gulf War, who complained: “Seven months ago, I could give a single command and 541,000 people would immediately obey it. Today I can’t get a plumber to come to my house”? Sic transit Gloria arma. One can understand how General Schwarzkopf must have felt. One can understand how former President/General Musharraf must feel in his own wilderness. One can empathise with his successor President Asif Ali Zardari in his predicament. How does one get half a million soldiers in the Pakistan Army to obey one’s orders, especially in the Northern Areas and FATA?


The recent accord between the form of the Pakistan Government and the substance of the Tehreek-e-Nifaze-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi that led to the Nizam-e-Adil Regulation 2009, tests not simply the ability of the Government to enforce its writ: it questions, and in doing so, undermines the concept of Pakistan’s identity as a nation-state.


Thumb through any text-book and it will teach you that the three attributes of a nation-state are national unity, a uniform national culture, and territorial integrity. There would be many a sub-nationalist Sindhi, Balochi, Pathan or Punjabi who would contest the assertion that Pakistan has even after 62 years achieved national unity. An equal number of Urdu-speaking Muhajirs, bilingual urbanites, and devotees of regional dialects would question where they fit into the mosaic of a national Pakistani culture.


Perhaps the strongest, most potent sting lies at the end of the tail of that definition. Does Pakistan possess territorial integrity, and by association can it enforce its sovereign jurisdiction? Examine its borders for a moment. In the south-east, the border on Sir Creek has yet to be defined. In the north-east, the border with India in Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved. In the Northern Areas, its sovereign ownership is yet to be legitimised. And in the north-west, the Durand Line enjoys less international acceptance than the Plimsoll Line. Where does Pakistan end and where do the borders of neighbouring countries begin? Even the East Germans knew where to start building the Berlin Wall. If, therefore, a Government with a national mandate — and none in the history of Pakistan has enjoyed such an unequivocal one as President Zardari’s current PPP-led coalition — is finding it difficult to delineate its borders [or get others to accept them], one can understand better why localists are nibbling away at them. How far will this erosion of governance go? Does a country have to lose an arm and a leg before it can finalise its silhouette? Pakistan thought it had done that once, in December 1971, when the fiction of a two-wing state was dispelled by India. The vivisection of Pakistan then was a neater operation. Thirty-seven years later, such precision may not be possible. Too many borders, too many issues, too many players, and not enough will on any side.


The Federally Administered Tribal Areas [FATA] are being replaced by TATA — Taliban Administered Tribal Areas. Their strength, like that of the invading Spaniards in Mexico, lies not in their own convictions as in the lack of self-belief of the modern Aztecs in Islamabad. The post-Musharraf Pakistan Army now conducts itself in a strictly professional way. It takes its orders from a civilian Government. Should it matter all that much that the civilian Government sits in Washington D.C.?


It is revealing that even before President Asif Ali Zardari has been invited to the US capital, his subordinate General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani is undertaking a week-long visit to the US. Will it be to explain why the Pakistan Army is not doing more against the Taliban and Al Qaeda? Is it to obtain more support to provide yet more support? Will the new-Obama administration demand more Pakistani bangs per US buck? One will know that only after Kayani returns, and even then only partially. Until then, political concessions such as the latest “accord” between a state and a non-state will substitute for national policy. Neville Chamberlain tried that in the 1940s. In his lexicon, it was peace with honour. Winston Churchill dubbed it appeasement.


Which number should President Zardari call to get a plumber to fix his leaking nation?





[COVERT MAGAZINE, 1-15 March 2009]